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Abstract
 Statelessness has been the key element to understand the history of the Korean diaspora.  The colonial/
post-colonial history of Korea and the collective displacement of the Koreans in the 20th century provoked 
ethno-nationalism and an independence movement among Korean diasporic communities.  Thus, Korean 
diaspora studies have examined how these populations have developed nationalism and strong connections 
to their ancestral homeland.  However, these studies tend to question and highlight the national 
belonging(s) of Korean diasporas in relation to their ancestral homeland and/or to their adopted homeland, 
while neglecting the diasporic consciousness that does not reside on the conceptual basis of a nation-state.  
Therefore, this article will focus on two diasporic Korean communities that became stateless in the 
twentieth century — Koreans in prewar Hawai‘i and in postwar Japan — focusing on the narratives on 
statelessness, interwoven by the second generations.  And as a conclusion, this article will argue that the 
statelessness is a byproduct of a nation-state system and modernist project, which promotes the idea that 
it is “natural” to have a sense of national belonging(s), while those who have no nation to attach their sense 
of belonging to are understood to be rootless wanderers.  It will also discuss the importance of 
conceptualizing statelessness in Korean diaspora studies by examining the ways in which national 
identities have emerged as a major discourse in diasporic identities, while non-national identities such as 
statelessness are silenced.
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I. Introduction: Statelessness in the History of Korean Diaspora
 Statelessness has been the key element to understand the history of the Korean diaspora.  The colo-
nial/post-colonial history of Korea, as well as the collective displacement suffered by Koreans, became 
the primary cause of the rise of ethno-nationalism that prevailed among Korean diasporic communities 
in the 20th century.  These sentiments turned community leaders as well as community members into 
ardent nationalists who supported the Korean independence movement in the first half of the 20th 
century: Koreans in Hawai‘i were even referred to as the “the Irish of the Orient” due to their strong 
nationalist sentiments in the US (B. Kim 1937: 126).  Thus, Korean diaspora studies have examined how 
these dispersed Korean populations developed a collective and political sense of belonging and shared a 
strong connection to their homeland as well as to their compatriots in other locales (R. Kim 2011, Yoo 
2010) 
 However, these studies tend to highlight two extreme senses of belonging that Koreans in the dias-
pora have developed.  One is a strong connection to the homeland, which is seen most predominately 
among first and sometimes second-generation diasporic Korean.  Their commitment to preserve their 
original culture, heritage, and co-ethnic ties, as well as their attempt to maintain their transnational ties 
to the homeland and to their compatriots have been the subject of investigation for previous studies. 
Another is the gravitation toward the adopted homeland that has been a frequent topic of research, 
which is evident among the younger generations of diasporic Korean communities, such as the second 
generation of Koreans in prewar Hawai‘i who laid claim to American identities, as well as third and 
fourth-generation Koreans in postwar Japan, who came to see Japan as their home.  The assimilation 
and socialization processes, as well as the cultural conflicts between older and younger generations, 
become critical issues in this context. 
 By shedding light on these two versions of identity, national belonging that is directed towards their 
ancestral homeland and/or adopted homeland, becomes the lens for understanding identities of the 
Korean diaspora.   However, this framing tends to neglect diasporic consciousness that is not conceptu-
ally based on a nation-state.  In the twentieth century, where almost all people are interpolated in the 
nation-state system, national and ethno-national identity has come to predominate immigration and 
diaspora studies (Parreñas and Siu 2007).  Korean diaspora studies are no exception, and placed great 
emphasis on the nationalism of dispersed Korean populations and remained reluctant to raise issues 
that goes beyond national and ethnic origin.  
 Therefore, this article will focus on the Koreans in Hawai‘i and Japan in order to shed the light on 
the experience of becoming stateless after their migration. This is because Koreans in Hawai‘i, became 
stateless in the prewar years, when their homeland ceased to exist after the Korean Empire was 
annexed by the Empire of Japan in 1910, while Koreans living in Japan became stateless in the postwar 
years, after their homeland regained its independence1).  By comparing these two different Korean 
communities, this article aims to grapple with the ways in which stateless has been imagined and expe-
rienced by the diasporas at different times throughout history of the twentieth century — when the 
homeland of one diasporic Korean community ceased to exist and when the homeland of another 
diasporic Korean community regained its independence, so that it was no longer an imaginary.  It will 
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also focus on the narratives interwoven by the second generations on their route of travel and their 
root of origin, since the second generations developed narratives that placed emphasis, not only on 
their ancestral homeland, but also on their adopted homeland and their domestic racial hierarchies. 
II. The Narratives of Second-generation Koreans in prewar Hawai‘i 
 Migration to Hawai‘i from the Korean Empire started in 1903.  The initial migrants were mostly 
single men who sought work in the sugar plantations as migrant laborers.  The sugar plantation 
owners expected the Koreans to replace Chinese workers and serve as strike-breakers for the Japa-
nese migrant workers, who composed nearly two-thirds of the plantations’ workforce (Patterson 2000: 
1-2).  However, the Korean government ended the migration of their nationals to Hawai‘i in 1905, a few 
months before the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 that made Korea a protectorate of the Empire of Japan; 
As a result, migration took place for only two and half years, leaving about 7,800 Korean men and 
women in Hawai‘i.2)  Of them, one-third of the migrants went back to Korea or migrated further into 
the US (Cho’e 2007: 18).  Consequently, only a small group of Koreans remained, composing less than 
2% of the Hawaiian population in the prewar era, with Japanese making up 38%, Filipinos making up 
17%, and Chinese making up 7% of the Hawaiian population in 1930 (Nordyke 1989: 178-179).  Thus, 
Koreans became the “minority of the minorities” in Hawai‘i (Harajiri 2000). 
 When the Korean Empire was placed under Japanese rule via the Governor-General of Korea in 1910, 
Koreans came to be regarded as Japanese imperial subjects and were once again eligible to travel and 
family members to migrate to Hawai‘i under the US-Japan Gentlemen’s Agreement (1908–1924).  Some 
married men reunited with their families, but most of the Korean migrant workers had been single 
when they arrived in Hawai‘i.  Thus, they began to get married via matchmakers, and as many as 951 
Korean women migrated to Hawai‘i by 1924 (W. Kim 1971: 22-23).3)  The arrival of Korean women began 
to balance the number of men and women on the islands and led to an increase in the number of 
second-generation Koreans being born in Hawai‘i.  The proportion of second-generation residents 
started to grow, and by 1930 second generation Koreans would constitute 54% of the Korean commu-
nity.  
 As soon as Koreans started meeting on the sugar plantations where they worked, they started to 
build a sense of unity as fellow “Koreans.”  On the sugar plantations, migrant workers were housed and 
divided into work units according to their national origin.   This was intended to enhance the competi-
tion among migrant workers from different national origins, but for the migrant workers it also became 
a space to develop membership, and in some cases comradeship.  Korean migrant workers came from 
various parts of the Korean peninsula and had different social and cultural backgrounds, sometimes 
with different dialects that made it difficult for them to communicate.  But working and living together 
Korean migrant workers quickly developed a sense of belonging as a “Koreans”.
 These diasporic Koreans first focused their way of life around a traditional community — a patriar-
chal village community or dongji hoi, like those often seen in rural parts of Korea, but soon they placed 
the Christian Church at the center of their communities.  Duk Hee Lee Murabayashi (2001: 15) notes 
that there was a 300% increase in the Methodist churches from 1903 to 1905 in Hawai‘i, and Wayne 
Patterson (2000: 67) points out Koreans were becoming overwhelmingly Christian during this time; by 
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the start of World War II, among the diasporic Koreans living on the islands, there were about 1,000 
Methodists, 1,000 Korean Christian Church members, 200 Episcopalians, 200 Seventh Day Adventists, 
and 100 to 300 Catholics.  
 These diasporic Koreans increasingly adopted the Christian faith for two reasons: The first was 
because there were already a number of Christians among the migrant workers, especially among the 
initial migrants.  Even among those who were not Christians prior to migration, many got in contact 
with Christian churches and ministers prior or during their migration and settlement because churches 
in urban areas of Korea often provided people who were looking for work with a place to stay. Korean 
ministers also often accompanied migrant workers on their journeys and during the settlement process, 
serving as translators and intellectual leaders, teaching migrant workers and their families how to 
write Korean and English (Yi 2007: 46).  The second reason for Korean migrant workers’ adoption of 
Christianity, was the way that they had already been affected by the displacing forces of moderniza-
tion; unlike most migrant workers on the sugar plantations of Hawai‘i, the Koreans had already become 
wage laborers prior to migration (R. Lee 2015: 51-68, R. Lee, 2017).  Historically, when Koreans had 
suffered due to famine and political unrest, they had crossed the border between Korea and China to 
seek work and make a living (Harajiri, 2005: 85).  Moreover, at the turn of the 20th century, Koreans, 
including farmers in rural areas, migrated to Russia and China to support their families back home. 
Migration within and across the country was fairly common in Korea at the turn of 20th century, and 
those who already had experience with migration were part of the wave of Korean migrant workers 
who made their way to Hawai‘i.  Therefore, when Korean migrant workers settled in Hawai‘i, they 
were not reluctant to move out of the plantations.  Eventually, many Koreans found better jobs in the 
cities, with some engaging in laundry businesses around the American military base.  This was a clear 
contrast to Japanese migrant workers, who came from farming areas in rural regions of Japan and 
formed communities with strong familial and hometown connections.  Thus, as these diasporic Koreans 
moved into the cities they adopted Western values, acclimating to a modern way of life, and Christian 
churches became a source of information, providing not only the language skills but also the resources 
migrants needed to adapt themselves into the American society. 
 In 1910, when these diasporic Koreans learned that their homeland had lost its sovereignty, they 
realized that they were left without a nation-state to protect their well-being.  However, when the Japa-
nese consulate in Honolulu announced that they should register as imperial subjects, many of these 
diasporic Koreans refused on the basis that they had arrived in Hawai‘i with Korean passports.  In 
turn, Koreans showed their support for the Korean National Association, the KNA or Kungmin-hoi, an 
organization established in 1907 by Koreans in Hawai‘i and the US mainland that represented the 
people of Korean in the US after their country had been annexed by Japan.   
 In the 1910s, KNA mobilized the community members into the independence movement, and charis-
matic Korean independence leaders started to arrive in Hawai‘i from the US mainland.  One prominent 
leader was Rhee Syngman, who later became the first president of South Korea.  During this time, the 
spirit of ethno-nationalism prevailed in the Korean community, and Koreans in the diaspora became 
known as the “Irish of the Orient” for their strong affection toward their homeland.  However, when 
the Provisional Government was established in China in response to the March First (Samil) Movement 
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in Korea (1919), Shanghai became the new center of the diasporic independence movement and leaders 
in Hawai‘i moved onto Shanghai to continue their nationalist activities.  The independence movement 
in Hawai‘i started to fade in the early 1920s and the Japanese consulate in Honolulu even reported back 
to Tokyo in 1925 that “the Independence movement in Hawai‘i is getting less and less popular” (Japa-
nese Consulate-general in Honolulu), and Government-General of Korea, Bureau of Police Affairs 
concluded in 1933 that “there is no influential group that can be recognized” (Chōsen Sōtokufu Keimu-
kyoku).  
 For members of the second generation, who did not have experience living in Korea and had lived 
most their lives during a time when Korea was under the colonial rule, Korea was their ancestral land 
but not a homeland as it was for the older generations. Second-generation Koreans witnessed the 
homeland nationalism of their parents, but they were American nationals by birth, who were taught 
that they were “Americans” at US schools.  But second-generation Koreans were simultaneously aware 
that they were viewed as second-class citizens.  Although at this time Hawai‘i was being held up as a 
model of racial harmony, on the islands the division between the white population, generally known as 
“Haoles,” and the non-white population, including racial and ethnic minorities and native Hawaiians, was 
explicitly marked and hierarchal, making the non-white population a target of racial prejudice.  For 
instance, the Commanding General of the Hawai‘i Department, Charles P. Summerall, offered a stereo-
typical comment on Hawai‘i’s non-white groups, referring to Koreans as “somewhat easily excited, 
superstitious and inclined to timidity” (Linn 1997: 162).  In addition, as a minority of the minorities in 
Hawai‘i, Koreans were usually not distinguished from the rest of non-white society.  Most of the time, 
they were regarded similarly to Japanese migrants, as is noted in the confidential military research of 
1930: “[Koreans] physiognomically resemble the Japanese very closely” (US Army, Hawaiian Depart-
ment, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence 1930: 1).  This perception eventually 
resulted in Koreans being categorized as “Japanese” and “enemy aliens” during World War II, simply 
because the government had difficulty distinguishing Koreans from Japanese (Macmillan 1979: 3-4).  
 National origin continued to matter for the second-generation Koreans in Hawai‘i, affecting their way 
of living in terms of their social and racial category in the census, drivers’ licenses and various kinds of 
permits, as well as their economic life: Many Koreans were engaged in laundry businesses around 
American military bases in the 1920s and 1930s because the Japanese, who were the largest minority 
group in Hawai‘i, had been precluded from obtaining commissions at the bases.  Thus, non-Japanese 
groups, like Koreans, were able to quickly establish laundry and tailoring businesses (R. Lee 2015: 
90-95). The second-generation Koreans in Hawai‘i engaged in activities that enhanced companionship 
among their diasporic community, like ethnic clubs at schools and ethnic performances at cultural 
events, while also associating with non-Koreans on a daily basis. 
 As a result, second-generation Koreans did not see themselves simply as American, but as American 
and Korean at the same time.  The editor of The American-Korean emphasized that second-generation 
Koreans should be proud of their Korean heritage, because they would be regarded only as Korean no 
matter what:  
“I should like to emphasize that this group of citizens must never forget that they will be recog-
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nized by other nationals as Koreans and therefore will be expected to know and to discuss their 
Korean national background” (Kang 1930: 15)
On the one hand, many second-generation Koreans stressed that their sense of national belonging was 
tied to two nations — America and Korea — but on the other hand, the colonialization of their home-
land made it difficult for them to assert that they were “Korean.”  They did not have any nation-state 
that they could claim as “Korea,” nor did they have any experience or memory of having lived in 
Korea, which left them with a sense of insecurity.  For example, in 1935 one second-generation Korean 
wrote about how he began to recognize himself as a person with no homeland, and noted that this way 
of thinking was shared not only by other second-generation Koreans, but also by many first-generation 
Koreans: 
“Some young people think that Japan is too powerful to overthrow right now; therefore the subject 
of independence, they argue, is impractical for the present.  They consider themselves a forgotten 
people ‘without a country’...  The younger generation as well as the old intend to make Hawaii 
their home.” (G. Lee 1935, 8)  
The second generations could not assert a sense of belonging as Koreans by advocating for the inde-
pendence of their homeland like the older generations.  A political split also complicated their involve-
ment in diasporic politics.  The independence movement in Hawai‘i had started as a unified front, but 
because the leaders had different ideas about how to go about campaigning for independence, the 
movement suffered a political split. This breach went so deep as to even cause violent attacks between 
opposing groups, and eventually divided the diasporic Korean community on the islands in half.  This 
rupture changed the ways in which Koreans associated within their community, even after the end of 
the independence movement, and second-generation Koreans regarded this split as a byproduct of 
issues related to the homeland, which complicated their relationship with the first generation, as well 
as their understanding of themselves as “Korean.”
 As a result, second-generations Koreans felt the urge for a new sense of unity among themselves. 
They organized groups to bridge the split among the Korean community: One of them was the student 
organization, the Korean Students’ Alliance of Hawaii, which was established by junior high school, 
high school, and university students in the 1930s.  The activities of these students were significant, 
since one-third of the Korean population consisted of students in 1930 (Korean Student Annual 1932: 18). 
They held social activities like dances and picnics, as well as conferences, youth rallies, speech contests, 
publishing yearbooks that listed all Korean graduates in the Hawaiian Islands. The Korean Students’ 
Alliance of Hawaii also provided a platform for second-generation Koreans to speak for themselves on 
issues including the dual sense of national belonging that second-generation Koreans had developed 
and the non-national sense of belonging that came from their having no homeland, no way to assert 
their identity as Koreans.  Among the students, there were those who stressed the importance the 
Christian Church’s central role in the Korean community, rather than nationalistic organizations.  The 
essay that won the first prize in the speech contest in 1936 read: “nationalistic organizations, fostering 
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nationalistic sentiments and fanning the already dead embers of the Korean nation in an effort to 
recreate its original glow, will find the Youth seemingly unresponsive and dull in respect to their prin-
ciples.  It is very unlikely that their organizations will be maintained, least of all improved upon” (Choy 
1936-1937: 6).  Second-generation Koreans questioned the centrality of a sense of Korean national 
belonging to their ancestral homeland, and searched for new ways to posit their sense of belonging.  
 However, the attack on Pearl Harbor and the outbreak of the Pacific War brought a completely 
different mode of self-consciousness to the Korean community and to the Hawaiian community as a 
whole.  Koreans, were now labeled as “enemy-aliens” and, because they were considered Japanese 
subjects by the wartime US government, many Koreans on the islands stopped speaking of their inse-
curity because of their lack of a homeland.  Instead, they started to speak about their support of the 
US war effort in the Pacific, emphasizing that Korea was on friendly terms with the US and claiming 
that Koreans should be seen as “friendly-aliens” by the US (L. Kim 2007; R. Lee 2008).  As a result, their 
enemy-alien status was repealed in 1943, while their support for the war effort continued.  The Korean 
community, now became a group of people with an explicit national belonging: The older generations 
once again asserted their support for the independence of their homeland, the younger generations 
pledged their allegiance to the US national body, and as a result both strengthened their sense of 
national belonging.
III. The Narratives of Second-generation Koreans in postwar Japan
	 In Japan, Koreans became stateless in the postwar years.  During the colonial period, Koreans were 
Japanese imperial subjects and technically became “Japanese” in legal terms.  Many Koreans came to 
Japan during the colonial period (1910–1945) and worked as laborers: This included migrant workers 
who came to make ends meet, as well as forced laborers who worked in severe conditions.  The 
number of Korean migrants vastly increased during late 1930s and into the 1940s, reaching 1,190,444 in 
1940 (1.63% of Japan’s population); the Korean population of a few prefectures, like Osaka and Yama-
guchi, even reached more than 5%, so that 1 out of 20 people in some areas were Korean (Tonomura 
2004: 55-56).  After the colonial era ended and Korean migrants in Japan were freed from colonial rules, 
the majority went back to Korea and the number of Koreans in Japan by 1946 had decreased to 
647,006 (Morita 1996: 176).
 The legal status of the Koreans remaining in Japan was unclear.  Under the Alien Registration Order 
of 1947, all former colonial subjects, including Koreans, were instructed to register with their local city, 
town, village, or ward office, and Koreans were categorized as people of “Chōsen,” which signified the 
geographical area of the Korean peninsula but did not denote any particular state.  There were 598,507 
Koreans registered under the Alien Registration Order of 1947 (Ibid.).  Then, in 1952, with the signing 
of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, former colonial subjects residing in Japan, including Koreans, were 
classified as “foreign nationals,” turning Koreans into people living in a foreign land.  However, Japan 
did not recognize the two nations founded on the Korean peninsula in 1948, the Republic of Korea 
(ROK) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).  Thus, Koreans in Japan continued to be 
considered people from “Chōsen,” and did not belong to any nation-state.  As a result the Koreans who 
had remained in Japan, a total of 535,065 people, became stateless (Ibid).
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 After this, Koreans and their descendants in Japan, who are called Zainichi Koreans (literally, “Koreans 
staying in Japan”), remained stateless for decades, with some even staying stateless for generations, 
because Japanese nationality was “granted by blood”; the children of stateless Koreans would go onto 
become a stateless people themselves.  In 1965, when the Basic Relations Treaty was signed between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea, some Zainichi Koreans acquired South Korean nationals, but those 
who refused to choose between the North and South or who were politically affiliated with the North 
continued to be stateless.4)
 In the postwar years, Zainichi Koreans were also identified as people with a different racial and 
ethnic background from “Japanese” people.  As Chikako Kashiwazaki (2009) argues, the significance of 
making Koreans “foreign nationals” in Japan, was not only about dividing Koreans from Japanese in 
terms of nationality, but was also a shift from the “imperial-colonial order” to an “ethno-national order” 
that classified Koreans in the Japanese/foreigner dichotomy as people with different racial and ethnic 
origins.  Further, as Hideki Harajiri (2000) has shown, the registration system in Japan continued to 
mark Koreans who became naturalized Japanese citizens, maintaining the division between the “pure” 
Japanese and people who had acquired Japanese citizenship through the naturalization process.  In this 
way, even those Zainichi Koreans who obtained Japanese nationality through the naturalization process 
were not able to become “fully” Japanese.  
 Moreover, racism and discrimination directed toward Koreans remained significant in post-war 
Japan. One of most common ways that Zainichi Koreans avoided racism in their everyday life was by 
using “Japanese” names (these names are known tsumei or “aliases”).  First-generation Koreans in 
Japan were recognizably different due to cultural markers and their language, but the second genera-
tion spoke fluent Japanese and together with the use of Japanese names, this allowed them to pass as 
“ordinary Japanese.”  By the second generation, the differences between Zainichi Koreans and “Japa-
nese” were no longer obvious, but prejudice, racism, and exclusion remained and was now carried out 
in more subtle and implicit ways.  John Lie (2001: 80-81) explains that Koreans made themselves invis-
ible in Japanese society through the use of “Japanese” names, a practice which is a byproduct of the 
“ideology of monoethnicity” in Japan.  
 The racism and exclusion that Zainichi Koreans faced in their everyday lives made it difficult for 
them to improve the image of Koreans in Japan. Because they were now a group of people living in a 
foreign country, who were considered racially and ethnically different, Zainichi Koreans came to long 
for ties with their homeland.  First-generation Koreans and many second-generation Koreans devoted 
themselves to a form of ethno-nationalism that stressed their ties to their homeland, whether it be 
South, North, or a unified Korea.  The political climate of the Cold War intensified this sense of 
belonging to either the South or the North.  Some of the first groups that began promoting ethno-
nationalism among Koreans in the postwar years were Marxist organizations that claimed Koreans 
should not belong to Japan but to their homeland and that Koreans should participate in building the 
Korean nation in order to regain their national and ethnic pride (Tonomura 2004: 431).  
 Koreans realized that they had a homeland, and this sense of belonging linked Koreans in Japan to 
their homeland, be it North, South or a united Korea.  The connection to the homeland, then, came to 
essentialize Korean’s racial and ethnic origin, as well as their sense of national belonging.  One second-
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generation Zainichi Korean wrote an essay asserting that having a homeland gave him hope to endure 
the racism that he faced in his life in Japan:
(Things were stolen at school and) I realized that everyone thought of me as a thief, just because I 
was Korean...  It was around that time when I first thought about my homeland.  Seeing me 
crying, my father said to me “bear it until we go back to our homeland”...  Since then, whenever I 
heard the word “homeland” I started to feel a vague excitement ... The fact of having a homeland 
made me believe that I was Korean (Pak 1975: 171).
Strong connections to the homeland even provoked “return” migration to Korea for some Zainichi 
Koreans.  Although most of the Koreans in Japan were originally from the southern part of the Korean 
peninsula, homeland nationalism led both first and second-generation Koreans to return to North Korea 
under The International Committee of the Red Cross’s (ICRC) repatriation project (1959–1984).  The 
number of returnees peaked in 1960, and eventually 93,340 Koreans returned to North Korea for good 
(Morris-Suzuki 2011: 1).  
 Other Zainichi Koreans chose to begin visiting their homeland now that it was no longer imaginary. 
Although Cold War politics did not allow all Zainichi Koreans to travel freely, sometimes preventing 
them from entering multiple times or at all, still it was a place that they could visit.  Koreans visited 
their ancestral homeland to assert their being “Korean.” However, for second-generation Koreans, such 
visitations did not always heighten their connection to the homeland, but rather made them feel discon-
nected.  Korea, both North and South, was a nation with an “ideology of monoethnicity,” just like Japan. 
Zainichi Koreans, who spoke little Korean, often were not regarded as co-ethnics by the people of their 
homeland, and were sometimes referred to as pan choppari, or “half-Japanese.”  The narrative 
presented earlier, which spoke about the longing for a homeland, continues as follows:
Ten years have passed since then.  My image, my love, my nostalgia for the homeland has 
vanished from my life.  My visit to the homeland was the cause.  It opened my eyes and confirmed 
what the homeland meant to me and it made me realize that I do not have a homeland to return 
to...  I do not know where my homeland is now (Pak 1975: 173).
There were also Zainichi Koreans who were not able to pursue this connection because of their 
linguistic and cultural difference. Second-generation Zainichi Koreans often spoke little or no Korean 
and found that they had a different cultural background when they visited their homeland. Some felt 
they were rejected from their homeland and were denied for not being “fully-Korean.”  One second-
generation Korean expressed this feeling as follows: “I wanted to be a perfect Korean (Chōsenjin) and 
went to Seoul to study, but I felt like I was rejected as a Korean and decided to go back to Japan” (U. 
Lee 1976: 51).  
 Consequently, some started to question the ways Koreans had developed their sense of belonging to 
their homeland.  In Zainichi Korean magazines and books published in the late 1970s and 1980s, this 
became known as the “identity issue” (Mizuno & Mun 2015 196-206).  One of the most significant narra-
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tives was about their search for a homeland.  Along with these narratives, some had concerns over 
their lack of connection to any state.  One second-generation Korean said that his belonging did not lie 
in Korea or Japan, or in any other existing national body: “We face discrimination by Japanese when 
we live in Japan, and we are rejected by our homeland and face reverse discrimination when we go 
back” (Chang 1976: 52). 
 Was it possible, then, for Koreans in Japan to develop a sense of belonging as “Japanese” or “Korean-
Japanese,” in the same way that some second-generation Koreans in prewar Hawai‘i had claimed them-
selves as “American” and “Korean-American”?  In terms of nationality, it was after all possible for 
Koreans to acquire Japanese citizenship and become “Japanese,” but as mentioned earlier, Zainichi 
Koreans were not able to become “fully Japanese” even when they acquired Japanese nationality.  In 
2009, Youngmi Lim (2009: 104-105) reported that there were about 5,000 Koreans being naturalized each 
year, but that naturalized Koreans still faced racism, treatment as “ex-Korean,” and were “impregnated 
[by] non-acceptance and singling-out,” leaving them alienated from the Japanese national community 
(104-105).  Moreover, for many years in the postwar era, obtaining Japanese nationality was regarded 
as a betrayal by Koreans.  Being rejected by the Zainichi Korean community, in addition to the preju-
dice coming from Japanese society, alienated naturalized Zainichi Koreans from any community, In 
1970, one naturalized Korean, Masaaki Yamamura, self-immolated at his university and left a note 
saying that he had nowhere to connect his belonging:
I wished to live as a Korean rather than a luke-warm half-Japanese.  But... I was rejected because I 
am a naturalized citizen...For them, in fact, I was a traitor who abandoned the homeland. I am not 
Japanese.  I am no longer a Korean but a person who lost his homeland (Yamamura 1971: 24-25).
The term “half-Japanese,” pan choppari was originally used by the Koreans in the colonial period to 
refer to those Koreans who fawned upon their colonizers.  But in the postwar years, as noted above, 
this word was used in Korea to pejoratively describe Koreans who lived in Japan and were not able to 
speak the Korean language.  However, it was also used by Zainichi Koreans to refer to people who 
“betrayed” their co-ethnics, i.e., the children of inter-marriage between Korean and Japanese or those 
who acquired Japanese nationality (Harajiri 1998: 108-109).  Therefore, for Masaaki Yamamura, it was 
not possible for him to develop a sense of national belonging to his adopted homeland, nor to seek 
connection to his ancestral homeland.  The idea of being “Korean” and the idea of being “Japanese,” 
were defined by ethno-national origin.  As a result, Zainichi Koreans who obtained Japanese nationality 
were also left with a sense of stateless that made it difficult for them to connect to any nation or state.
IV. Conclusion: Conceptualizing Statelessness in Korean Diaspora Studies
 Why is a sense of statelessness excluded from the project of Korean diaspora studies?   The answer 
is because Korean diaspora studies, while aiming to unveil the histories, memories and subjectivities of 
the globally dispersed Korean population, approach diaspora as a state of being caught between two 
nations, questioning the national belonging(s) of the diaspora.  Although the world today has entered an 
age of globalization, with all the post-modern values this implies, national belonging remains important, 
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and Korean diaspora studies has continued to celebrate and investigate the sense of national 
belonging(s) among Koreans.  
 Examining statelessness then, we see that what is often lost in diaspora studies is the unspoken 
history of non-national identities.  Statelessness is the flip side of nationalism and statehood, and both 
Korean diasporas examined in this article exemplified the insecurity that statelessness has caused with 
regard to those communities’ sense of being; this provoked political movements and the rise of ethno-
nationalism to regain the independence of their homeland in the beginning and developed into compli-
cated intertwining forms of self-affirmation for later generations.  Statelessness is a byproduct of the 
nation-state system, which promotes the idea that it is “natural” to have a sense of national belonging(s), 
while those who have no nation to attach their sense of belonging(s) to are understood to be rootless 
wanderers.  As a consequence, statelessness matters not only to diasporas that have experienced such 
a situation or members of diasporic communities whose lives are affected, shaped, and touched by the 
history and memory of statelessness, but is also crucial to nationalistic projects that prioritize national 
belonging over non-national belonging.  Thus, it is essential to highlight non-national identities, 
including narratives of statelessness, to understand the ways in which national belonging(s) has 
emerged as a major discourse in the history of Korean diasporas in the modern era, while other identi-
ties have been silenced.
 By comparing the two different Korean communities, this article provided two different type of state-
less diasporic communities that have emerged in the modern nation-state system.  First, Koreans in 
prewar Hawai‘i can be classified as a de facto stateless person.5)  The Japanese consulate in Honolulu 
announced that all nationals of the Korean Empire should register as Japanese subjects, but many 
Koreans refused on the basis that they had arrived in Hawai‘i with their Korean passports.  At that 
time in Hawai‘i, Koreans were not able to become American nationals because as foreigners of Asian 
descent they were “ineligible for citizenship.”  As a result, they were left without a state to protect 
their well-being.  Second, Koreans in postwar Japan can be classified as a de jure stateless person. 
Koreans were nationals of The Empire of Japan during the colonial period.  The end of World War II 
freed Koreans from their colonized status, but the legal status of Koreans who stayed in Japan 
remained unclear.  Then, in 1947, all non-Japanese residents in Japan were entered into the alien regis-
tration system, which designated Koreans as people from Chōsen, a term signifying the geographical 
area of Korean peninsula.  With the signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1952, all former colo-
nial subjects who remained in Japan were designated as foreign nationals, transforming Koreans who 
stayed into a group of people living in a foreign land, designated with the nationality “Chōsen” and did 
not belong to any nation-state.  
 Another important aspect that these two diasporic communities have exemplified is the difference on 
the sense of statelessness that they have developed, and its implication to the modernity.  The narra-
tives of second-generation Koreans in prewar Hawai‘i exposes what it means to become stateless in the 
modern era, the reality of living the flipside of the coin.  Second-generation Koreans in Hawai‘i were 
American nationals by birth, but they lived in a society where “national origin” mattered in every 
aspect of their lives, though they did not have an independent state to which they could attach their 
sense of “national belonging.”  As a result, some diasporic Koreans stressed their identities as both 
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Korean and American, and other members started to question these senses of belonging that were 
anchored to a nation-state, and instead started to claim a sense of belonging that lay outside national 
frameworks.  On the other hand, the statelessness of Koreans in Japan demonstrates the ways in which 
diasporas have been left out of the modernist project; statelessness is not like the flipside of the coin, 
but it is rather like what a coin becomes without its connection to a nation-state.  After becoming 
“foreigners” and stateless in the postwar years, Zainichi Koreans faced racism in their everyday lives 
and this in turn heightened a sense of ethno-nationalism that stressed ties to the homeland — South, 
North, or a unified Korea.  Most second-generation Zainichi Koreans continued to support this ethno-
nationalism for their homeland, but among them, there were those who questioned this connection, 
especially individuals who could not connect a sense of belonging to their ancestral homeland because 
they had been rejected as “fully-Korean,” leaving them with no homeland to claim as their own.  In 
addition, it was possible for Zainichi Koreans to naturalize and become Japanese nationals, though it 
was difficult for them to become “fully” Japanese or make Japan their homeland.  As a result, they 
were stuck in the situation where they had no place that they could attach sense of belonging to. 
Second generation Zainichi Korean scholar Suh Kyungsik (2003), refers to this sense of disconnection as 
being “half-refugee”: The term “refugee” refers to people “who think it is okay to have no flag or state 
for themselves, and who are shaped to think this way from their everyday experiences (298).” He 
claimed that Zainichi Koreans are half-refugees in this sense, and statelessness remains an ongoing 
experience for Zainichi Koreans.
 The UNHCR estimates there are at least 10 million people around the world today who are without 
any form of nationality (UNHCR 2017).  These people “may have difficulty accessing basic rights such 
as education, healthcare, employment and freedom of movement.  Without these things, they can face a 
lifetime of obstacles and disappointment” (Ibid.).  Statelessness is not merely a part of history but is an 
ongoing issue affecting a significant number of people that is likely to continue in the future.  There-
fore, it is essential to conceptualize statelessness and bring statelessness into a constructive dialogue, in 
order to develop a field of research and gain insights into modern history that, up until this point, has 
been examined through the lens of national belonging. 
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Notes
1)  Abe (2010) claims that Zainichi Koreans are not stateless person today because they are able to claim their 
nationality to the Republic of Korea or to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  However, this article will 
highlight the historical significance of Zainichi Koreans being categorized as a person of “Chōsen” in 1947, which 
signified the geographical area of the Korean peninsula but did not denote any particular state.  For Abe’s 
discussion, see Kohki Abe, “Overview of Statelessness: International and Japanese Context, Commissioned by 
UNHCR Representation in Japan”, (Tokyo: UNHCR, 2010). Retrieved from https://www.unhcr.org/jp/
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wp-content/uploads/sites/34/protect/pro_8_Overview_of_the_Statelessness_2012.pdf
2)  In the “Report of the Commissioner of Labor Statistics on Hawai‘i 1915”, the United States Department of 
Labor stated that the number of Korean migrants who arrived during these two years was 7,859 (6,717 men, 677 
women, and 465 children).  However, according to the passenger list compiled by Duk Hee Lee Murabayashi, 
7,291 Koreans boarded ships to Hawai‘i.  Retrieved from http://www.korean-studies.info/pdf/pass200a.pdf.
3)  Cho’e (2007: 28) points out that the exact number of Korean picture brides cannot be identified from the 
resources currently available.
4)  Today, the vast majority of Zainichi Koreans have become the nationals of the Republic of Korea or Japan. 
There are 29,550 people who are registered as a person of “Chōsen” under the foreign registration system in 
Japan, while 288,787 people are registered as “Tokubetsu Eiju (Special Permanent Residency holders, referring 
to a person or descendant of former Japanese imperial subject living in Japan)” among 449,634 people who are 
registered as a person of “Kankoku (the Republic of Korea)” nationality holder in 2018. (Data retrieved from the 
Official Statistics of Japan https://www.e-stat.go.jp/stat-search/files?page=1&layout=datalist&toukei=00250012&
tstat=000001018034&cycle=1&year=20180&month=24101212&tclass1=000001060399)    The number of Zainichi 
Koreans with Japanese nationality is not statistically available.  
5)  As set out in Article 1(1) of the 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, de jure stateless-
ness refers to a person who “is not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its law” 
(Arakaki, 2016: 35).  A stateless person also refers to a person who has “nationality legally but cannot receive 
effective protection from the state of nationality,” who are sometimes called de facto stateless persons (Ibid.).
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